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MITIGATING DISASTER:
A COMMUNITARIAN RESPONSE*
Robert M. Ackerman**
In this essay, I present a communitarian view as to how we
might best respond to disaster, and in particular, to losses suffered
by the direct victims of disaster. My focus will be on financial com-
pensation to disaster victims, which admittedly occupies only a
small part of the spectrum of disaster response. Emergency "first
responder" activities are matters about which I have no expertise;
volunteering at my local food bank hardly qualifies me to advise
FEMA or the Red Cross. The blunders for which these organiza-
tions have recently been responsible are apparent, and so are some
of their causes, but the engineering of more effective responses is a
matter on which I would be foolish to opine.' My background in
tort law, conflict resolution, and administrative law does provide a
modicum of expertise on compensation systems, so it is in that area
that I will offer some communitarian principles and suggest some
practical considerations.
SOME COMMUNITARIAN PRINCIPLES
Central to communitarianism is the proposition that we do not
exist on this planet as isolated, individual units, but as interdepen-
dent beings, in a web of relationships. While "proponents of mod-
ern communitarianism do not represent a single uniform
position, '"2 we would generally agree that the "self cannot exist in
* © 2007, by Robert M. Ackerman.
** Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of Law. The
author is grateful to Kathryn Mason for her excellent research and to Penn State Dickinson
School of Law and its Dean, Philip McConnaughay, for their continuing research support. The
author would also like to thank the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution and its Faculty Advi-
sor, Professor Lela Love, for bringing about the symposium in which this article originated. The
article is written in connection with the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution's 2007 Sympo-
sium, ADR in the Aftermath: Post-Disaster Strategies.
I Elsewhere, I have suggested the response to Hurricane Katrina as a prototype of un-
derperformance by government. See generally Robert M. Ackerman, Taking Responsibility,
4 TENN. J. L. & POL. (forthcoming 2008).
2 Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Only Connect: The Right to Community and the Due Pro-
cess Liberty Interest in State-Sponsored Racial Integration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008).
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physical and metaphorical isolation."3 We are very much our
brothers' and sisters' keepers. And so when disaster strikes, be it
at the World Trade Center, in a field in western Pennsylvania, on
the shores of Southeast Asia, or on the Gulf Coast, we have a natu-
ral human inclination to reach out and to engage in Tikkun Olam
(healing the world).4 We do not pause to question; we do not ask
"who is worthy" or "who brought this upon him/herself;" we help
first, and ask questions later.
Some are better organized for such efforts than others. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Mormon Church, a religious
enterprise known for its high degree of organization and the com-
mitment of its adherents to philanthropy,5 proved more proficient
at disaster relief than the Federal Emergency Management Admin-
istration (FEMA), a government agency ostensibly established for
just such a mission. Neither size nor officialdom is synonymous
with efficiency or compassion. In the United States in particular, a
strong civil society tradition should remind us that government is
not the exclusive source of assistance in time of need; sometimes, it
is not the best source of such assistance. Communitarians value
the role of civil society - the tapestry of voluntary associations such
as civic clubs, neighborhood organizations, corporations, labor un-
ions, religious institutions, charitable organizations, educational in-
stitutions, and even Robert Putnam's bowling leagues - in stepping
forward to meet various needs in time of disaster.6 Almost two
centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that the relatively weak,
3 BEAU BRESLIN, THE COMMUNITARIAN CONSTITUTION 31 (2004).
4 See INTERFAITH FAMILY, GLOSSARY OF TERMS, http://www.interfaithfamily.com/
common/glossary/gl_233.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
5 See GENEROUS GIVING, http://www.generousgiving.org/page.asp?sec=28&page=242 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2008) (noting that "Mormons believe that giving is an important way of imitating
the compassion of their god .... The Mormon church clearly addresses a huge scope of con-
cerns, and it is not uncommon for Mormons to give fifteen percent of their incomes to their
church."); The Mormons, Humanitarian Programs, http://www.pbs.org/mormons/themes/
humanitarian.html ("In the Hurricane Katrina of 2005 we know that once again [our] trucks
were there before the National Guard was even allowing relief through. So the response is in-
credibly fast, incredibly efficient.") (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); The Mormons: Hurricane Katrina,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UVJRxZO9910 (a short documentary on the work of the
Mormon Church in response to Hurricane Katrina) (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); see also THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, Newsroom, http://newsroom.lds.org/ldsnews
room/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=77921 l1cf279311OVgnVCM100000176f62OaRCRD&vgnextchannel
=9ae41ll54963dOlOVgnVCM1000004e9461OaRCRD (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (noting the
amount of supplies provided by the Church to clean up the wreckage of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita).
6 See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM. BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
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unengaged, and unobtrusive government of the United States was
supplemented by a strong civil society.7 Americans were joiners,
de Tocqueville observed, and the churches, civic societies, guilds,
fraternal organizations and other institutions they formed and
joined often served as helping organizations, by design or by
necessityA
Today, American government is stronger, more engaged, and
more intrusive. But it is not almighty. Private associations can
sometimes intervene more effectively than a cumbersome and, as
appeared to be the case in the wake of Katrina, uncaring govern-
ment. And even when government intervenes generously and effi-
ciently, as with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
[the "Fund" or "September 11th Fund"], such intervention cannot
alone provide a complete healing for the direct victims of disaster.
A web of support systems, some more intimate than government
(even government at a local level), is necessary for Tikkun 0lam.
A third and subordinate communitarian principle is that when
we do look to government for assistance, we should, as a general
proposition, impose responsibility on the smallest political units ca-
pable of dealing with the problem. 9 This is rooted less in the politi-
cal and constitutional concept of federalism than in common sense.
Smaller geographic units are closest to the people and the problem;
more often than not, they are best attuned to the problem and can
respond most efficiently and directly. Local knowledge is valuable
in assessing needs, finding ready solutions, and speaking the lan-
guage of those in need of assistance.'" But some problems are of a
scale that requires the mobilization of larger political units; indeed,
some require the deployment of armies uniquely suited to meet a
substantial logistic challenge. The September 11th tragedy and
Hurricane Katrina are good examples of such phenomena. When
your basement is flooded, it may be enough to call on your imme-
diate neighbors to help mop you out. But sometimes your neigh-
7 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, VOL. I, passim (Gerald Bevan,
trans., Penguin Books Ltd. 2003) (1835).
8 More recently, political scientist Robert Putnam has lamented the diminishing participa-
tion of Americans in voluntary associations such as civic clubs, improvement associations, chari-
ties, and even bowling leagues. See generally PUTNAM. supra note 6.
9 The Communitarian Platform states, in pertinent part, that "[glenerally. no social task
should be assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to do the job .... What can be
done at the local level should not be passed on to the state or federal level, and so on." AMITAI
ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 260 (1993).
10 See Mel Rubin, Setting Up a Statewide ADR Post Disaster Program: Unanticipated Conse-
quences, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 351 (2008).
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bors are themselves overwhelmed by the deluge, and you must
look further afield for help. At the end of 2004, victims of a tsu-
nami in Southeast Asia were gratified to learn that their "neigh-
bors" came from all over the world, and that help from them was at
hand. Sometimes it takes a global village to raise a populace from
disaster.
But communitarians also put stock in personal responsibility."'
While our instincts are charitable, upon close examination we may
be disinclined to reward people for failing to look after themselves.
And we may be inclined to draw a distinction between compassion
for people in genuine need and subsidies for activities in which
people have assumed a risk. 2 For example, we might stop short of
subsidizing protection from mudslides for communities on the Cali-
fornia coast, leaving individuals to decide for themselves whether
they are willing to pay the price of living in a dangerous environ-
ment (and look to private markets to insure against loss), while
enjoying the benefits of an ocean view. The Katrina disaster, in my
mind, stands in sharp contrast. Granted, residents of the Gulf
Coast had taken it upon themselves to live at or below sea level,
but they did so in justifiable reliance on a system of levees, canals,
navigation and transportation engineered, built, and maintained
primarily by government. Indeed, only government could have
constructed and maintained a system of such scale. And so it is
only appropriate for government to respond to a disaster that it
might have averted through more effective conduct, conduct upon
which the citizenry had relied. 13
We might part company with those proponents of Katrina re-
lief who claim a vested "right" for victims to return to neighbor-
hoods that remain vulnerable to flooding. Certainly the ties of
neighborhood, family and church are important to communitari-
ans. People are not fungible commodities capable of thriving as
easily in one place as the next. Wholesale removal of populations
has serious human rights implications; these implications are all the
more cause for concern when the displaced group is composed
11 ETZIONI, supra note 9, at 9-10.
12 See Robert M. Ackerman. Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsi-
bilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 672-75 (1995).
13 Crime victim compensation schemes have been justified on the theory that "the govern-
ment has an absolute duty to protect its citizens from crime." Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim
Compensation in a Post-9/1l World, 79 TULANE L. REV. 167, 212 (2004). Whether or not one
accepts such an extended version of government duty, the connection in the case of Katrina is far
more direct. See Ackerman. supra note 1.
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predominantly of a racial or ethnic minority.14 But communitari-
ans hesitate at the minting of new "rights," such as the "right" to
live permanently in a flood-threatened area, requiring millions of
dollars in government subsidies for protection against the persis-
tence of nature. 5 We prefer, in instances such as these, to weigh
the interests in property and neighborhood against the public ex-
penditures necessary to ensure safety against the ongoing threat of
hurricane and flood. It is bad economics and bad policy to subsi-
dize life in areas not meant for human habitation. Better to re-
serve some low-lying areas for water catchment or open space, and
rebuild our homes on higher ground.' 6
These principles must necessarily be considered in the context
of budgetary limitations and practical politics. The public ex-
presses a great deal of sympathy and compassion for victims of
crime, for example, but the financial support the government pro-
vides to crime victims falls far short of the need. Victim compensa-
tion funds have been established in every state to provide relief to
crime victims.1 7 These funds have been supplemented by federal
support under the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA). s These pro-
grams are chronically underfunded; in fact, they are supported pri-
marily not by tax revenues, but by fines and penalties collected
from criminal miscreants.1 9 They are also subject to a number of
restrictions."0 The big disasters attract the most attention and, con-
sequently, the greatest public funding. The September 11th Fund
is instructive in that regard. The loss of life in the September 11th
14 Even well-intentioned programs, such as the Ujamaa program in 1970's Tanzania (in
which people were first encouraged, then forced, to move into larger communities), have their ill
effects. KWAME NANTAMBU, TANZANIA'S SOCIALIST REVOLUTION: WHAT WENT WRONG?
(Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.trinicenter.com/kwame/2007/1801.htm (examining Presi-
dent Nyerere's implementation of Ujamaa). In contrast, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986
required that a large population be removed from the affected area: this forced evacuation.
while unpleasant. was a necessity. See NEA COMMITTEE ON RADIATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH,
CHERNOBYL TEN YEARS ON RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH IMPACr 18, 27-28 (1995), available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/rp/chernobyl/vrml/chernobyl.html.
15 See ETzIONI. supra note 9, at 5-9.
16 Care should be taken, however, not to affect a racial or ethnic gerrymander that interrupts
the continuity of a community and thereby distorts its character. For a brief history of the dis-
placement of impoverished African-Americans in New Orleans, see Alecia P. Long, Poverty Is
the New Prostitution: Race, Poverty, and Public Housing in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 94 J. AM.
HIST. 795 (2007).
17 See Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 167-68.
18 Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 10601-10605 (2000)).
19 Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 187-89.
20 Id. at 189-94.
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attacks was on a scale that begged for intervention on a national
level.2 ' The attacks were a shared national trauma, seen by mil-
lions of people on television, and the American people came to
believe that the direct victims of the September 11th attacks had
suffered on behalf of the entire nation.22 No doubt, the Fund re-
flected the genuine compassion of the American people. But it
came about largely as an afterthought, as a quid pro quo for pro-
tection of the troubled airline industry, tacked onto legislation ini-
tially designed to forestall suits against the airlines.23 The
legislation establishing the Fund precluded its beneficiaries from
suing the airlines or any of the other potential defendants whose
negligence arguably enabled the attacks.24 As a consequence, the
September 11th tragedy produced federally-funded victim assis-
tance distinguishable in scale and type from responses to natural
disasters, the Oklahoma City bombing, or the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center, none of which threatened an essential
industry.
THE COMPENSATION GAP
In principle, it is difficult to distinguish mass disasters such as
September 11th and Katrina from more individualized tragedies, at
least insofar as justification for recovery for individual losses is
concerned. Every murder, fatal automobile accident, drowning,
electrocution, and other accidental death is a disaster to the indi-
viduals who have experienced it and to their immediate families. It
is hard to tell the family of a murder victim or an individual who
has drowned in an unexpected flood why he or she is any less enti-
tled to compensation than a victim of the September 11th terrorist
hijackings or the Katrina flooding. The mass disasters attract our
attention. Certainly they are more newsworthy, more notorious,
21 Generous payments from the September l1th Victim Compensation Fund were neverthe-
less supplemented by substantial contributions from state, local and private sources. Robert M.
Ackerman, The September llth Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Re-
sponse to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 153-54, n. 79 (2005).
22 Id. at 158-59.
23 Id. at 159. The original Republican proposal imposed caps on recovery against two major
airlines facing the prospect of a multitude of suits as a consequence of the September llth trag-
edy. A federally-funded compensation scheme for victims was added at the insistence of Con-
gressional Democrats and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Id. at 143.
24 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act. IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230, § 405(c)(3)(B) (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 2003))[hereinafter ATSSSA].
Suits against the al Qaeda terrorists were not precluded by the legislation. Id.
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than their individual counterparts, but are their victims any more
worthy of public largess? Why does government, and especially
the federal government, rush into mass disasters, not only with
emergency assistance, but with long-term compensation, however
uneven, however inefficient in its delivery? Why do we not recog-
nize a similar need, albeit on a lesser scale, when an individual
loses his or her life in a violent manner?
The simple answer is a political one. Those disasters that at-
tract the most public notice also receive our attention in terms of
public largess. Graphic portraits of human suffering are brought
into our homes through the mass media; the press, charitable orga-
nizations, the public, and ultimately government are mobilized; the
clarion call is made for all good citizens to come to the aid of the
latest cause. In the aftermath of September 11th, a major industry
was threatened, and few concerns are more likely to attract the
attention of policymakers in Washington (especially Republican
policymakers) than a threat to a major business enterprise. There
is, however, a justification of greater substance: Some tragedies are
of a scale such that they can be addressed only through the kind of
large-scale mobilization for which only the largest and best-
equipped institutions - the Federal Government, the Red Cross,
Oprah Winfrey, the Mormon Church - can respond. For smaller,
more personal tragedies, there remain (we hope) more localized
responders - local religious congregations, charitable organiza-
tions, and the most intimate of helping institutions, the family. But
certainly any number of victims falls into a vast and yawning com-
pensation gap.
Another, even larger compensation gap is produced by the
traditional system of tort recovery. The tort system is a scheme of
corrective, not distributive, justice. It transfers the loss from victim
25 For example, the American Red Cross gave significant grants "to more than 100 estab-
lished non-profit organizations throughout the U.S. that deliver community-based services to
address the needs of people who were directly affected by 9/11." AMERICAN RED CROSS, SEP-
TEMBER ASSISTANCE, http://www.redcross.org/general/0, 1082,0_152_1392,00.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2008); see Press Release, FEMA, Hurricane Katrina Mississippi Recovery Update:
March 2008, Release No. 1604-639 (Mar. 31, 2008) http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?
id=43091 (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (noting that FEMA has given over $1.2 billion dollars to
individuals and families affected by Hurricane Katrina). I had intended the reference to Oprah
Winfrey as a joke, until I learned that Ms. Winfrey's net worth was $2.5 billion and that she had
given $2 million for Hurricane Katrina and Indian Ocean Tsunami relief. See Nancy Franklin,
Oprah's World, NEW YORKER, March 24, 2008, at 76; see also Roger Friedman, Oprah Winfrey's
Charities Worth More Than $200 Million. Fox NEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,241782,00.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). See supra note 5 for discussion of the
Mormon Church's commitment to disaster relief.
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to wrongdoer only if the latter is found to have been at fault (i.e.,
liable for an intentional tort or negligence) or to have engaged in
one of a discrete number of activities to which the law attaches
strict liability. Accident victims are entitled to compensation only
if they can show fault or a basis for strict liability. Others, who
suffer injuries every bit as severe, but who cannot make this show-
ing, are left to their own devices. The same lot falls to those vic-
tims who were unfortunate in their "selection" of tortfeasor. Those
who have been injured by the insolvent and uninsured are unlikely
to enjoy any recovery; in fact, most such victims are advised by
counsel (usually dependent on a contingent fee) not to sue. These
unfortunates include the victims of some of the most violent and
brutal crimes, whose perpetrators, if found, rarely have had the
good graces to accumulate significant assets or obtain insurance.
While the tort plaintiff's entitlement to compensation is de-
pendent on the character of the defendant's conduct, the amount
of compensation the defendant is required to pay is less dependent
on the reprehensibility of her conduct than on the circumstances of
the plaintiff, such as her potential earnings, life expectancy, and
susceptibility to injury.26 That is because compensation, like liabil-
ity, is based on notions of corrective justice, in that a defendant,
once found liable, is supposed to pay damages sufficient to place
the plaintiff in the position she would have been in but for the de-
fendant's tortious conduct. Meanwhile a large, cumbersome, and
expensive machine - staffed by judges, other court employees,
plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, insurance adjusters, mediators,
and medical and other scientific experts - is employed to process
claims and make determinations of fault and damages. The system
may work as an incentive for care, to reinforce the type of individ-
ual and corporate responsibility valued by communitarians (al-
though some of that incentive may be diluted by insurance). But it
by no means assures all accident victims, injured through no fault
of their own, full compensation for injury.
The unfairness inherent in the compensation gaps described
above could be alleviated, to some extent, through the provision of
universal national health insurance. Often, the most pressing need
of victims of disaster - personal or national - is medical assistance,
and the availability of health care for all would alleviate not only
the immediate need, but the financial dislocation and worry that
26 The reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct may play a role in the assessment of puni-
tive damages. but these come into play in only a very small percentage of cases. DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS 1062 (2000).
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imposes intolerable burdens on too many families of limited
means. 27 The gap between those eligible for tort damages or disas-
ter relief and those who are not could be expanded to include
others suffering from poor health that is not attributable to any
crime, accident, or disaster. The lottery of life casts some people as
more susceptible to ill health than others; many such people are
less able to occupy jobs through which they can obtain comprehen-
sive health insurance. Our communitarian compassion calls for us
to spread their health-related costs as well.
Unemployment and disability benefits would be the next logi-
cal layer of economic assistance. The first source of compensation
in this regard should probably be privately obtained insurance ben-
efits, available to many people through their employers. State
compensation funds, backed by sufficient public resources, should
be available to pick up the slack. State-administered victims' com-
pensation funds typically require that beneficiaries exhaust other
sources first; the victims' compensation fund becomes payer of last
resort. 28  This is probably as it should be. Even the legislation es-
tablishing the very generous September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund required a reduction of benefits for funds obtained from col-
lateral sources.29 This feature is at odds with the collateral source
rule found in traditional tort law, but for good reason. 0 The collat-
eral source rule is based on the premise that plaintiffs should not
be penalized in their damage awards for their foresight in obtaining
27 Ironically. this did not appear to be the case with respect to one very recent and promi-
nent disaster. Most of the immediate victims of the September l1th attacks were killed within
hours of when the four jets crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field near
Shanksville, Pennsylvania. But the September 11th attacks did leave several hundred victims -
some of them rescue workers - who suffered from the long-term medical consequences of inhal-
ing toxic particles in the vicinity of the collapsed towers. See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate
Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1849 (2002); Ackerman, supra
note 21, at 160-61. These largely forgotten victims, ineligible for compensation from the Fund,
would have benefited greatly from a health care system offering universal benefits. Others, al-
ready covered by health insurance, would have appreciated more generous disability and unem-
ployment compensation.
28 Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 190.
29 ATSSSA. supra note 24, at § 405(b)(6). An administrative regulation promulgated by the
Special Master excluded charitable gifts and tax benefits from collateral sources subject to the
statutory offset. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2002). "Had charitable gifts been included in the definition
of collateral sources, then millions of dollars that Americans had donated to the many charities
established to help the September l1th victims would have become, in effect, contributions to
the U.S. Treasury." Ackerman, supra note 21, at 151 n.68.
30 The collateral source rule precludes the reduction of a tort plaintiff's damages for pay-
ments received from sources other than the defendant, such as the plaintiff's first-party health or
disability insurance. Because first-party insurers are usually entitled to subrogation, the plaintiff
rarely receives a double recovery. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 1060.
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first-party insurance (such as health and disability insurance), for
which they have, of course, paid.3' This rule again reflects the cor-
rective justice orientation of the tort system. The tortfeasor is re-
quired to correct the wrong for which she is responsible.
Government-financed compensation systems have a more commu-
nitarian goal, that of distributive justice.32 The object is not to shift
the loss to the one who occasioned it; rather it is to spread the loss
among the citizenry, so that one individual or family need not bear
it disproportionately. Government assistance should fill the most
egregious gaps, but it need not restore the more affluent victims to
their previous favored status.
The goal of a government-financed system should not be to
make anyone rich, or even to compensate them for the non-eco-
nomic losses recognized by the tort system. Rather, the goal of a
system financed primarily by taxpayers should be to give victims of
disaster - large-scale or personal - the wherewithal to get on with
their lives. Many American families live without the margin of se-
curity enjoyed by those in the upper economic strata. These Amer-
icans live from paycheck to paycheck, with incomes barely
sufficient to make ends meet.33 While flood, fire, and premature
death are tragedies for any of us, they can have long-term cata-
strophic consequences for families living on the edge. The death or
disability of a breadwinner in such families can send them on a
downward spiral into poverty that can endure for a generation or
31 Whether health, auto and disability insurance premiums have been paid directly by the
victim or by her employer should be of no consequence; in the latter case, the premiums have
been earned by the victim.
32 This was a theoretical flaw in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which re-
tained the tort formula for compensating victims from taxpayer-generated funds. This formula,
more appropriate to a corrective justice system, was probably retained (a) due to a lack of imagi-
nation during a legislative drafting frenzy or (b) because the Fund was being offered as an alter-
native to a conventional tort action, and its creators wanted victims and their families to choose
the former over the latter. See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 162-64.
33 There is every indication that the percentage of Americans in these circumstances is in-
creasing, as evidenced by the growing number of working-class families in which there is more
than one income-earner. Beth Potier, Middle-Class Income Doesn't Buy Middle-Class Lifestyle,
HARV. U. GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http:/lwww.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/10.30/
19-bankruptcy.html: Marilyn Gardner, Two Incomes, More Debt?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 17, 2003, at 12: Jane Bryant Quinn. Escaping the Trap, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15. 2003, at 63;
Christopher Shea, Two Incomes, One Bankruptcy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2003, at D1; All
Things Considered: Two-Income Families at Risk of Financial Crisis (NPR radio broadcast Sept.
9, 2003); Jeff Madrick, The No-Frills Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at C2; James
Surowiecki, Leave No Parent Behind. NEW YORKER, Aug. 18, 2003, at 48: Maryanne Murray
Buechner, Parent Trap, TIME, Sept. 15, 2003, at A20.
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more 34 . Sustenance that allows such families to get past the imme-
diate crisis can provide for a more stable future, allow these fami-
lies to become productive once again, and add, rather than detract,
from the nation's wealth. An effective system of personal disaster
relief is thereby likely, in the long run, to reduce what Professor
(now Judge) Guido Calabresi has called "secondary costs," i.e., the
public costs of accidents.35
FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR DISASTER: A PROGRAM
THAT WORKED
Despite the many objections to the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, it worked remarkably well. A no fault, ad-
ministrative remedy provided over $7 billion in assistance to vic-
tims and families, without resort to the time-consuming, expensive
process inherent in the tort system. The Fund was administered by
neither government bureaucrats nor politicians, but by a dispute
resolution professional, Kenneth Feinberg, working without com-
pensation and assisted by other professionals recruited specifically
for this mission.36 But the September 11th Fund was expensive,
more expensive than we can afford on a regular basis. The circum-
stances that gave rise to the Fund are unique in history, and, we
hope, never to be duplicated. As a consequence, the September
11th Fund is regarded as sui generis.3 7 The Fund, a product of a
late night drafting session without voting by any congressional
committee, 38 demonstrates the flaws of ad hoc, emergency mea-
sures: By their very nature, they are hastily conceived, based on
emotional responses as much as practical need, are uneven in ap-
34 See DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL Ac-
COUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 905 (5th ed. 2005):
Injury that causes economic loss... has radiating effects that impose losses on others
- family members, employers, and society as a whole. The effects are not necessarily
only economic in nature, and society also has an interest in seeing to it that uncom-
pensated economic harm to a worker, for example, does not lead to a spiraling disin-
tegration of the family structure itself. This view might result in the feeling that some
minimal compensation would be more important than a careful determination of
fault.
Id.
35 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 40 (1970).
36 See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 197; see also Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator, How
Kenneth Feinberg Determines the Value of Three Thousand Lives, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002,
at 42.
37 See Ackerman. supra note 21, at 205.
38 Id. at 143.
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plication and therefore unfair.39 We might therefore consider what
kind of advance provision should be made to compensate disaster
victims, beyond the underfunded state victim compensation pro-
grams that mete out negligible amounts to crime victims.
A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME FOR COMPENSATION OF DISASTER
VICTIMS: SOME THRESHOLD ISSUES
During the live symposium upon which this essay is based, I
suggested some threshold issues to be considered in connection
with federal disaster relief, so as to avoid the problems inherent in
ad hoc remedies. One of these issues involved the criteria to be
employed to determine whether federal intervention was appropri-
ate. The most obvious criterion is that of scale. Some disasters are
simply too large to expect a single city, county, or even state to
fully address them. The economic impact of a disaster like Hurri-
cane Katrina is too great for relatively small and economically dis-
advantaged states like Louisiana and Mississippi to bear. In cases
such as these, the Federal Government should serve as a reinsurer,
assuming burdens in excess of a predetermined, quantifiable
amount; justified, ideally, by objective criteria, rather than political
influence.
A second criterion had more to do with the inherent nature of
the disaster. Politically motivated attacks against the people of the
United States merit a national response. The September 11th at-
tacks were launched not just against the cities of New York and
Arlington, Virginia (much less an open field in rural Pennsylvania);
instead, they were attacks upon the entire nation. To expect a
purely local response would have been akin to asking the Territory
of Hawaii to respond to the Pearl Harbor attack on its own. Under
this criterion, the Oklahoma City bombing would qualify for fed-
eral relief. While perpetrated by Americans, its immediate target
was a federal building filled with American employees; its avowed
purpose was to protest federal government policies. This differen-
tiates the attack from other despicable but localized events, such as
the Virginia Tech shootings (Blacksburg, Virginia, 2007), 4° the
39 Some of the flaws in the September 11th Fund legislation were ameliorated through ad-
ministrative regulation. See id. at 148-56.
40 John M. Broder, 32 Shot Dead in Virginia; Worst U.S. Gun Rampage, N.Y. TIMES, April
17 2007. at Al.
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"Son of Sam" shootings (New York City, circa 1977),'4 or any num-
ber of street crimes that plague Americans. The collapse of the
Twin Towers was an event with national resonance; David
Berkowitz' killing spree in the same city twenty-four years earlier
was a purely local matter.
Another issue I thought worthy of consideration was how fed-
eral relief would dovetail with other forms of assistance, from state
and local governments or private sources. Of course, duplication is
to be avoided, as are significant gaps in responsibilities. A further
issue was whether we could craft an administrative remedy that
would serve as a sufficient substitute for common-law tort reme-
dies, so as to overcome due process challenges. The September
11th Victim Compensation Fund survived such challenges because:
(1) the generous awards provided came close to replicating tradi-
tional tort remedies and (2) victims (or families) were entitled to
opt out of the Fund and pursue a common law tort action (albeit
with limitations).4 2 My initial response was that less generous com-
pensation schemes would be more likely to survive due process
challenges if they were established in advance of any claim, rather
than after the claim arose (as with September 11th). But the need
to establish a government compensation scheme as a substitute
remedy is necessary only if there is a desire to protect a potential
defendant from liability. Such was the case with the airline indus-
try in the wake of the September 11th tragedy.43 While we might
conjure up other such instances, they are likely to be quite rare.
There is no national interest in protecting the McVeighs and bin
Ladens from liability. As to natural disasters, God is not amenable
to service of process, as Job sadly discovered.
Another question I posed during the symposium was whether
the political will existed, particularly on a national level, to enact
and fund such measures in the absence of a perceived crisis du jour
or threat to a vital industry. My tentative answer is no and yes.
The no part stems from the current debate over national
health insurance. I have suggested previously in this essay a single-
payer national health insurance program that would provide com-
prehensive medical coverage for all Americans. There is reason to
believe that the administrative savings of a single-payer system
41 Article, A Year Later 'Son of Sam' Still On Loose, N.Y. TIMES. July 3, 1977, at 98.
42 ATSSSA, supra note 24, at § 408.
43 Not all potential defendants were protected by the September 11th legislation. Al Qaeda
remained liable to those who could execute a judgment against Osama Bin Laden and his hench-
men. Id. at § 405(c)(3)(B).
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would go a long way toward financing coverage for those who are
presently uninsured.44 And as I've previously suggested, such a
system could provide a critical layer of support to disaster victims
as well as victims of crime and poor health, thereby alleviating the
problem of unequal treatment. But even as the Republican Party
has come into disfavor, its fearsome warnings of "creeping social-
ism" continue to haunt political discourse and stunt the prospects
for comprehensive health insurance coverage.45 And even among
Democrats (as evidenced by the plans set forth by several presi-
dential candidates), the proposals for federal intervention to pro-
vide health care are quite timid. The plans proposed by the leading
candidates call not for a single-payer, universal health care system;
rather, they adopt a piecemeal approach, in which the government
provides health insurance only for those least able to pay.46 The
result, at best, is likely to be an underfunded, inefficient patchwork
remedy.
But here is the yes part as to the existence of political will: A
statutory framework for effective federal disaster relief already ex-
ists, and it employs criteria similar to those suggested throughout
this essay. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974, as
amended,47 [the "Stafford Act" or "Act"] provides for comprehen-
sive federal assistance to states, local governments, private agen-
cies, and individuals in the event of major disaster. A "major
disaster" is defined under the Stafford Act as:
[A]ny natural catastrophe ... or, regardless of cause, any fire,
flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the
determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity
and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance.., to supple-
ment the efforts and available resources of States, local govern-
44 See Nicholas D. Kristof, A Short American Life. N.Y. TIMES. May 21, 2007, at A19: KAO-
PING CHUA, SINGLE PAYER 101 (2006) available at http://www.amsa.org/uhc/SinglePayerl01.pdf:
but see David Hogberg, Single-Payer Silliness, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, May 12, 2005, http://
www.nationalreview.com/comment/hogberg200505l2O8O9.asp.
45 See 2004 REP. PARTY PLATFORM 64 (Sept. 1, 2004) (reaffirming the party's "firm rejection
of any measure aimed at making health care a government-run enterprise").
46 The candidates' own websites probably provide the best insights as to the health plans
they think will survive electoral scrutiny. See Hillary for President American Health Choices
Plan, http://www.hillaryclinton.com/feature/healthcareplan/summary.aspx (last visited Jan. 4,
2008); Obama '08 Healthcare, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/healthcare (last visited Jan. 4,
2008). Congressman Dennis Kucinich (who has terminated his candidacy) stood alone among
the major-party presidential candidates in calling for a comprehensive, single-payer plan.
KUCINICH FOR PRESIDENT, A HEALTHY NATION, http://www.dennis4presldent.com/go/issues/a-
healthy-nation (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2007).
MITIGATING DISASTER
ments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage,
loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.48
The italicized language employs the scale criterion for federal
intervention suggested above. The Stafford Act provides for tech-
nical assistance4 9, emergency support teams 50 , emergency assis-
tance to state and local agencies 5I and use and coordination of
relief organizations 52. It acknowledges the involvement of civil so-
ciety, repeatedly invoking the American National Red Cross, the
Salvation Army, and the Mennonite Disaster Service by name (but
not to the exclusion of other organizations), and the need to coor-
dinate efforts among governments and organizations.53
Furthermore, the Act provides for temporary housing assis-
tance,54 unemployment assistance (for up to twenty-six weeks),55
cash assistance to individuals and households up to $25,000,56 and
food stamps. 57  Other provisions allow for emergency mass feed-
58 5ing, relocation assistance,59 legal services60 and professional coun-
seling services. 61 Granted, the $25,000 limitation on cash assistance
appears paltry compared to the awards from the September 11th
Fund.62 But the amount provided is in addition to a number of in-
kind services, and we must again remember that we are dealing
with distributive justice to save people from personal catastrophe,
not corrective justice to right all wrongs.
48 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
49 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5131-
5132, 5165, 5204b (2008).
50 Id. § 5144.
51 Id. §§ 5191-5193.
52 Id. § 5152.
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 5152, 5170(b) (2007).
54 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b) (2007) provides, inter ahia, that "[tihe President may provide financial
or other assistance . . . to individuals and households to respond to disaster-related housing
needs .... " Such assistance may last for no more than eighteen months, unless "the President
determines that due to extraordinary circumstances an extension would be in the public inter-
est." Id. at § 5174(c).
55 42 U.S.C. § 5177 (2007).
56 42 U.S.C. § 5174(e)-(h) (2007). This assistance was previously capped at an inflation-
adjusted $10,000.
57 42 U.S.C. § 5179 (2007).
58 42 U.S.C. § 5180(a) (2007).
59 42 U.S.C. § 5181 (2007); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601 et seq.
60 42 U.S.C. § 5182 (2007).
61 42 U.S.C. § 5183 (2007).
62 Awards to families of deceased victims ranged from $250,000 to $7.1 million, with a me-
dian award of $1,677,633. Personal injury awards ranged from $500 to $8.6 million. See Acker-
man, supra note 21, at 181.
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Several provisions of the Stafford Act incorporate the commu-
nitarian values discussed earlier in this essay. Section 5149(a) 63 en-
courages utilization of services and facilities provided by state and
local governments, in accordance with the communitarian principle
that the smallest governmental units are often best-equipped to
perform certain functions. Likewise, § 515064 establishes a prefer-
ence for the use of local firms and individuals. The Act provides
for coordination of federal, state, and municipal relief efforts,65 and
prohibits duplication of benefits. 66 The Act also prohibits discrimi-
nation in the provision of disaster assistance.67
Provisions of the Stafford Act pertaining to insurance reflect
the communitarian principle of personal responsibility. Section
5154(a) 68 requires an applicant for assistance in the repair, restora-
tion, or replacement of damaged facilities to comply with regula-
tions requiring that adequate insurance be obtained to protect
against future loss to such property. Section 5154(b) 69 renders a
person who has previously received assistance under the Act ineli-
gible for further assistance unless all insurance required under
§ 5154(a) 70 has been maintained. Section 5154(a) 71 imposes similar
requirements regarding required flood insurance.
The Stafford Act is a communitarian measure allowing the na-
tional community, as represented by the federal government, to
come to the aid of citizens in times of acute disaster. It allows for
compassion for citizensin need, leavened by a measure of responsi-
bility. It recognizes the complementary roles of national, state and
local governments, along with that of civil society. If federal disas-
ter relief was a failure in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it
would appear to have been a failure in execution, not in concep-
tion. No statute can command an administration to display more
competence or compassion than we saw during Katrina's after-
math; a statutory mandate requiring the president to consistently
employ all of the remedies in the Stafford Act would be too mech-
63 42 U.S.C. § 5149(a) (2007).
64 42 U.S.C. § 5150 (2007).
65 42 U.S.C. § 5152 (2007).
66 42 U.S.C. § 5155 (2007). This provision is also consistent with notions of distributive jus-
tice. The Stafford Act is designed to provide relief, not to place victims in precisely the same
position they would have been in but for the disaster.
67 42 U.S.C. § 5151 (2007).
68 42 U.S.C. § 5154(a) (2007).
69 42 U.S.C. § 5154(b) (2007).
70 42 U.S.C. § 5154(a) (2007).
71 Id.
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anistic, preventing a response tailored to the disaster at hand. Bet-
ter to trust to the political process to provide correction to lapses in
administrative judgment and competence.
MONEY CAN'T Buy ME LOVE
We should hasten to point out that material assistance of the
type provided under the Stafford Act, or even through the Septem-
ber 11th Victim Compensation Fund, is an incomplete remedy for
the human suffering that accompanies both natural and man-made
disaster. Many of the scars of disaster are not immediately visible.
While housing, health care and income replacement can address
material needs, victims of major disaster as well as small-scale trag-
edy often require emotional support and counseling. This type of
assistance is usually best provided not by government, but by the
types of institutions mentioned previously in our discussion of civil
society - churches, fraternal organizations, civic groups, profes-
sional associations - as well as that most intimate of institutions,
the family. Government can lend material support to such institu-
tions, and can channel victims to providers, but thereafter, it might
be best for government to step away. Different people have dif-
ferent needs in this regard: some might find solace in a religious
institution, others through professional counseling services, still
others through the kindness of friends and family. These differen-
tial, fine-tuned individual needs suggest a variety of responses for
which government bureaucracies are not especially well-equipped.
Traditional tort damages are generally divided between two
types: Economic (or "pecuniary") damages and non-economic (or
"general") damages. Economic damages represent money needed
to purchase services, such as medical care, or to replace tangibles,
such as income lost due to personal injury. Non-economic dam-
ages are more abstract; they are considered a substitute for things
that cannot be reclaimed, like good health or peace of mind. In
most cases, money damages, however generous, are a poor substi-
tute for these priceless assets.7" The ministrations of civil society
and the support of friends, family and community may, in some
72 Some of my friends in the plaintiffs' trial bar will disagree. and will say that emotional
support and the ministrations of civil society are poor substitutes for cold, hard cash. Of course.
it is difficult to calculate a thirty-three percent contingent fee on the ministrations of civil society
or the support of friends and family.
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instances, be a superior remedy. Our legal nostrums have limited
reach. Money alone does not bring about Tikkun Olam.
Bernard Mayer has explained that human responses to conflict
come in cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions. 73 The
stress that accompanies personal tragedy is a similar phenomenon.
Mayer reminds us that no single device or remedy can fully satisfy
the need for resolution in each dimension, and that "closure does
not often happen in a neat, orderly, synchronized manner. 74
Some wounds strike so deep that they never heal. But time, pa-
tience, and community can provide the type of solace that govern-
ment mechanisms cannot. Law is not always the answer.
73 BERNARD MAYER. THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 98-108 (2000).
74 Id. at 108.
